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Preface
Legal history has too often been left to lawyers to define, and one result 
is the paucity of works on local and state legal topics that appeared to 
many to be “unimportant.” American legal historiography, until the re-
cent development of “history from the bottom up,” was devoted large-
ly to the national government, where “the action took place.” Political 
scientists, historians, economists, and sociologists studied the Consti-
tution from their particular vantage points and produced studies with 
an appeal limited primarily to other members of their fields. “As a con-
sequence,” Francis Heller concluded, the US Supreme Court’s work 
“was over- evaluated but seldom illuminated.”¹
State and local legal history in the nineteenth century was neglected 
in part because historians do not have the legal skills to read and to inter-
pret technical documents and complicated legal jargon. One can study 
the relationship to economic forces or the concept of legal thought or 
an aspect of group activity, but the rigors of the historical process sub-
ject the aspects of these disciplines and others to its peculiar demands. 
As a result, only the histories of the high courts in Florida, Massachu-
setts, Missouri, Tennessee, Virginia, Nebraska, and Washington have 
been written, although other similar studies are now under way. This is 
unfortunate, because it is here that the “the meaningful, everyday ju-
dicial opinions” are dispensed.²
Michael H. Hoeflick asserts that “the work that has been produced 
[in Kansas] primarily has been written by lawyers writing for other law-
yers,” and he justly laments the fact that much of the sources for writing 
this study “have been destroyed or lost.” His observations apply only 
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tangentially to the Kansas Supreme Court, as he is referring to the dis-
appearance of attorneys’ papers and similar legal documents. Most of 
the vital evidence on the court is available, providing enough material 
for at least a sketchy history of the institution, and that is what I have 
attempted to do in this volume. It is not a legal history of Kansas, nor 
is it a definitive history of the court and its work. It is a brief overview, 
conveniently located in one volume, of the judges and the decisions 
they wrote that helped mold Kansas legal history within the context of 
Kansas constitutional, political, economic, legal, and social history. I 
hope the book will encourage future scholars to expand and build on 
this foundation. To try to be definitive would be foolhardy and would 
require the cooperation of many scholars and the writing of many vol-
umes. Both of these options appear unfeasible at this time.³
The great twentieth- century legal scholar James Willard Hurst en-
couraged his students to understand “how the law has really worked in 
social experience.” Yet another scholar has stressed the point that legal 
historians have insisted on “a radical separation between law and poli-
tics.” I reject this latter distinction and support Hurst’s injunction be-
cause this subject is a specialized form of political history. Politicians 
shape the law and use it for whatever type of social and economic pol-
icies their constituents want their government to pursue. Judges are 
citizens with their own political, social, and economic predilections, 
and these often, consciously or subconsciously, influence the writing 
of their decisions.4
From the territorial period to 1990, the supreme court produced 245 
volumes of opinions. Each volume contains approximately 250 deci-
sions. How does the historian master such productivity? How does one 
organize and illuminate this mass of legal thought and development? 
How can the major trends be condensed so that an author can write, 
and readers can absorb, with any confidence of comprehension? There 
are many approaches, of course, and everyone who researches state su-
preme court histories will follow a different scheme. I have elected to 
choose the cases that best demonstrate the historical, social, legal, po-
litical, and economic trends of the period covered in each chapter.
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During the latter half of the twentieth century, for instance, a great 
change came about in our judicial system labeled “legal liberalism.” 
This involved the concept that courts in general could, and should, be 
used to bring about social change, and it originated particularly in the 
“Brandeis Brief,” developed in support of the Oregon law limiting work-
ing hours for women. Louis Brandeis, “the people’s attorney,” followed 
the unusual approach of writing a couple of pages of legal precedent 
for his brief and over one hundred pages of statistics demonstrating the 
impact of long hours on women’s physical and mental well- being in or-
der to have the law sustained. The concept of legal liberalism would be 
employed particularly in Kansas at midcentury, with the Brown pub-
lic school case having a great impact on the justices in the course of de-
segregating American life because of the psychological influence racial 
segregation had on children.5
Alexis de Tocqueville paid scant attention to the role political par-
ties played in selecting American judges, but from the beginnings po-
litical parties were crucial in the Kansas system of popular election. A 
half century after Tocqueville wrote, Lord Bryce believed this system 
of selection of justices, “nominally by popular election, practiced by the 
party of wirepullers,” often kept “the most honorable men” from reach-
ing the bench. This led, in the Kansas experience, to judges having to 
kiss babies and nail an inordinate number of posters to telephone poles 
during the campaign process and frequently continuing their political 
careers from the state’s highest bench. This process finally culminated 
in a demand in the 1950s to change the system of selecting judges to fol-
low the principles of the Missouri Plan, which established a nonparti-
san commission of lawyers and laymen to propose names to the gover-
nor for appointment to the bench. They would subsequently stand for 
retention on a nonpartisan ballot.6
In studying the Kansas Supreme Court I decided first to consider 
the judges and the experiences that shaped their thinking. I then ex-
amined the decisions that molded Kansas law in the first century and 
a half of the court’s existence. My examination focuses on both how 
the judges shaped legal history and how the cases they heard constitut-
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ed a part of the political, economic, social, and legal story of the Sun-
flower State. Each chapter is introduced by a brief historical survey to 
set the scene for the era. Some biographical material on the judges fol-
lows, with a presentation of pertinent cases of the period. The histori-
cal background is vital not only because it was within this context that 
the judges shaped Kansas law but also because the political process in-
volved them directly, as they were nominated by political parties, cam-
paigned for elective office, and sometimes continued partisan activities 
while on the bench until the mid- twentieth century.
I am indebted to many people for their assistance in researching and 
writing this volume. Foremost are the staff of the History Center at the 
Kansas State Historical Society. Charles Warnica and Antoinette Sat-
terfield of the Government Documents Division, Hale Library at Kan-
sas State University, were of great assistance. The Manhattan Public Li-
brary was an important source for interlibrary loan. Ramon Powers has 
been highly supportive of my efforts in writing Kansas history. At his 
suggestion I contacted retired Justice Fred N. Six in the early stages of 
this study. He kindly gave me advice, based on his experience and inter-
est in legal history, that greatly improved my approach. After the study 
was finished, he generously spent time reading the entire manuscript 
and offering many pertinent suggestions for improvement. I must also 
credit him with the title, although I acknowledge that the subtitle is 
mine. Professor Derek Hoff of Kansas State University took time from 
his busy schedule and read part of the manuscript, suggesting changes 
in format and organization for which I am grateful.
Of course, I cannot hold these scholars accountable for my decision 







Ad Astra per Aspera
To the stars through difficulties. Kansas was enduring Herculean chal-
lenges, even agony in some cases, in its first few years of existence as a 
territory. Although it suffered a shorter tenure as a territory than any 
of its surrounding neighbors, those seven years were tumultuous in-
deed. But the New England Emigrant Aid Company stocked the ter-
ritory with sound settlers who knew how to endure adversity, and its 
citizens survived both the buffeting of Mother Nature and the batter-
ing of hostile neighbors.
“Bleeding Kansas,” historian Nicole Etcheson calls it, was born out 
of the sectional conflict over slavery that was rending the nation in two 
during the 1850s. In 1820, with the admission of Missouri to the Union, 
politicians created an even balance in the Senate, and the issue of ex-
pansion of slavery was resolved by drawing a line at 36°30' through the 
Louisiana Purchase and prohibiting slavery above that line. From 1820 
to 1850 the minority South managed to protect its “peculiar institu-
tion” by maintaining this balance of free and slave states in the Union, 
and thus equality in the Senate, to prevent passage of legislation inim-
ical to its labor system. Then in 1854 Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Il-
linois introduced the Kansas- Nebraska Act to create those two territo-
ries north of the 36°30' line with popular sovereignty to determine their 
future status. Let the settlers decide whether they wanted slavery or free 
labor. This necessitated repealing the Missouri Compromise of 1820, 
and Douglas’s act gave the South a chance to gain Kansas as a slave state 
after surrendering it three decades earlier. Migration normally moved 
directly westward, so, under Douglas’s law, slave- holding Missourians 
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would eventually settle Kansas and vote for slavery in an area the Mis-
souri Compromise had mandated to be free soil.¹
Normality ceased to exist, though, once the North faced the loss of 
a “safe” area and the South was offered this unexpected opportunity 
to gain a new slave state. The alternative to the expansion of its system 
was in the Southwest, a region inimical to the slave labor system and 
its economic viability, while the Free Soilers enjoyed the prospects of 
unlimited expansion in the remainder of the territory west of the Mis-
souri River. How then to protect equality through the Senate? Time ap-
peared to be on the side of the antislavery forces, so southerners happily 
determined to exploit this golden opportunity. Northern abolitionists, 
in turn, were outraged over the giveaway and organized the New Eng-
land Immigrant Aid Company to assist Free Soilers in settling Kansas 
and make certain the future state remained free. Thus Missouri Bor-
der Ruffians settled extreme eastern Kansas and drafted the Lecomp-
ton Constitution to bring Kansas into the Union as a slave state. Free 
Soilers, on the other hand, moved farther west and wrote the Topeka 
Constitution to make Kansas free. Neither would accept their oppo-
nents’ position on votes in their elections, and civil war erupted in the 
Sunflower State several years before the national conflict exploded in 
1861. Kansans were literally bleeding when Missourians sacked Law-
rence and abolitionist John Brown retaliated by raiding Potawatomie. 
The local civil war proceeded with Jayhawkers and Border Ruffians 
murdering each other.²
In 1857 the southern- dominated Supreme Court needlessly inflamed 
this sectional conflict with the Dred Scott decision. Chief Justice Rog-
er Taney of Maryland spoke for the Democratic majority members in 
Congress when he declared that Dred Scott was a slave under Mis-
souri law and, as such, could not sue in federal courts for his freedom, 
although his master had taken him to free territories in his travels as 
an army doctor. When Scott returned to Missouri, Taney held, his le-
gal status was determined by Missouri law. This should have ended the 
issue. But, in an unnecessary obiter dictum, Taney observed that the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 forbidding slavery in the territories un-
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constitutionally deprived owners of their slave property as protected un-
der the Fifth Amendment. Southerners and Democrats hailed his de-
cision as the definitive interpretation of the subject, as they could now 
take their slaves into the territories and have them protected, while Re-
publicans denounced the decision as an obiter dictum and promised 
to reverse it with a constitutional amendment once they came to pow-
er. The real issue was not the status of blacks but political power and 
where it would reside, and neither side would compromise.³
Proslavery elements ignored the Topeka Constitution, and abolition-
ists boycotted the referendum on the Lecompton Constitution. Final-
ly, Douglas cried “enough of this farce,” because popular sovereignty 
obviously was not working in Kansas as he had intended. He cooper-
ated with William English of Indiana to promote the English bill call-
ing for a new election in Kansas. This measure became law in May 1858 
and provided for federally supervised elections in the territory to deter-
mine the status of slavery. The proposal, supported by the Democratic 
administration of James Buchanan, was loaded in favor of the South. 
If Kansans would accept slavery, they would be admitted to the Union 
immediately and be given large tracts of federal lands. If they voted to 
remain free, they would remain a territory indefinitely, with no land 
grants. Despite this enormous enticement, Kansans voted twelve thou-
sand to two thousand against the Lecompton Constitution. Free Soil-
ers had won the race to settle the Jayhawk state, although one historian 
concluded that the gop “must have brought many a dormant Repub-
lican back to life” in this election. He insisted that “not more than five 
or six hundred Democrats” would have opposed the proslavery docu-
ment (an exaggerated figure) and that the final vote “exceeded by 2,411 
the highest vote cast for any one of the Republican candidates in the 
State election of 1859.”4
Following this election, politics ran amok in Kansas and the nation. 
John Brown’s famous raid on Harper’s Ferry in October 1859 and his 
resulting martyrdom in the eyes of northern abolitionists added fuel 
to the flames. When many Republicans made Brown a martyr, this 
convinced southerners that “Black Republicans” were ready to abolish 
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slavery by force and considered their occupation of the White House 
as sufficient reason for secession from the Union. When Republican 
Abraham Lincoln narrowly won the Electoral College with a minority 
vote of 40 percent of the popular vote in November 1860, this severed 
the last great tie of the Deep South to the Union. Prior to this election 
several southern states adopted the Alabama Platform, which pledged 
their delegates to walk out of the Democratic national convention if 
the party did not approve a plank protecting slavery in the territories. 
The majority of the Democrats, wishing to win in 1860, compromised 
by promising a platform to abide by any “clear- cut decision” of the Su-
preme Court on the question. When “Black Republican” Lincoln won 
the election on a plank of no further extension of slavery in the territo-
ries, representatives of several southern states walked out of Congress, 
and the Republicans, now a majority there, admitted Kansas as a free 
state on 29 January 1861. As a contemporary politician expressed it, “the 
agony is now over” for Kansans.5
Meanwhile, Free Soilers were drafting the Wyandotte Constitu-
tion in anticipation of statehood. Section iii of that document created 
a judicial branch and was influenced by the experience of Kansas dur-
ing the territorial period. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 created a 
governmental system for colonies, or “territories,” as they were then 
called, that operated so efficiently that subsequent Congresses used it 
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It created territo-
rial governments consisting of a governor, a secretary, and three judg-
es appointed by Congress to rule until statehood, when the area would 
be admitted to the Union on a basis of equality with the original states. 
Unfortunately, this excellent system had the built- in weakness of al-
lowing the ruling party, by its appointments, to control the future pol-
itics of the territory. A Congress controlled by Democrats appointed 
Democrats for territorial government positions, and Republicans and 
Whigs appointed their supporters when they were in power. The terri-
torial governor subsequently used his patronage to appoint fellow par-
ty members to assure supremacy of his party when statehood arrived. 
Of the six governors appointed for the territory, three fled the territory 
Buy the Book
Introduction 5
through fear of assassination, and two were removed or resigned under 
pressure. This system affected the thinking of Kansans with its plan of 
appointed judges.6
The territory of Kansas had three supreme court justices, who also 
served as judges of the three district courts. The courts experienced fre-
quent changes in personnel. New judges, appointed by presidential com-
missions, claimed their positions sometimes over the vigorous protests 
of the current judges who had received no notice of their replacement. 
Sessions of the territorial supreme court usually lasted five to nine days 
annually, and often the judges failed to attend.
At one point Governor John Geary threatened the judges with “mil-
itary law and he would supercede their courts unless they took mea-
sures to clear their dockets.” Chief Justice Samuel E. Lecompte of Mary-
land “was a man of great force of character” who was “openly partisan 
in his support of slavery.” Governor Geary charged “party bias” as an 
excuse for his attempt to remove Lecompte from office. Sometime lat-
er the chief justice responded to Geary’s letter by admitting he was bi-
ased toward the Democratic Party, as he was a lifelong member. Yes, he 
agreed that he was proslavery, and he would continue to support that 
institution. He did deny Geary’s charge of “criminal complicity with a 
state of affairs which terminated in a contempt of all authority,” as the 
governor insisted. Lecompte became a leader of the proslavery forces, 
founded the town of Lecompton, and presided over the convention that 
wrote the Lecompton Constitution.7
President James Buchanan appointed John Pettit of Indiana to re-
place Lecompte. Pettit had served as a US senator and had a “quite 
high” reputation as a legal scholar. The free press, though, charged him 
“with being a hard drinker, time waster, and cigar smoker,” with one 
journalist complaining with exaggeration that Pettit was “the stagger-
ing embodiment of all vices.” Pettit rendered an interesting decision 
in the case of a slave who ran away from Kentucky to Kansas. Two in-
fant children inherited Peter Fisher from their deceased father, and 
their guardian, Rain C. Hutchinson, pursued Fisher with an extradi-
tion order issued under the authority of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. 
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As Hutchinson was about to return to Kentucky with the runaway, 
Lewis Weld freed Fisher “with a club, knife, pistol, and other hurtful 
weapons” in violation of the federal law. Judge Pettit quashed Weld’s 
indictment through a strict construction of the Fugitive Slave Act. The 
law must be enforced, Pettit averred, but it provided for recapture of 
the fugitive by the owner, his agent, or his attorney, and “all other per-
sons are thereby excluded from doing the same thing as effectively as 
if they were positively forbidden.” Hutchinson was neither the owner 
of the slave nor the “agent or attorney” of the owners, and thus the fu-
gitive slave law was not violated, according to the judge. Pettit admit-
ted that his opinion was “hastily written in the midst of turmoil, in-
terruption, and confusion,” and if he had been able to consult even an 
inadequate law library, he would have found that the guardian acted 
legally within the intent of the law. But Pettit was from Indiana, and 
his decision was popular with the Free Soilers. If former Chief Justice 
Samuel Lecompte of Maryland had heard the case, the decision would 
have been quite different. Another territorial judge, Sterling Cato, was 
strongly proslavery and “issued partisan decisions,” being “completely 
destitute of a sense of justice.”8
The president appointed these justices for four- year terms, yet they 
actually served at his pleasure. Appeals from their decisions went di-
rectly to the US Supreme Court, but only one such decision from the 
territory of Kansas ever arrived in Washington, and it involved a land- 
sale contract. Presidents Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan appoint-
ed “either nine or ten” of these judges. Eight served at least briefly, but 
only six served “more than a few days.” None were from Kansas, all 
were Democrats, and at least one, Rush Elmore of Alabama, brought 
his nineteen slaves with him to the Sunflower Territory.9
The Kansas winters proved to be too severe for the slaves. Mrs. El-
more, who had never cooked before, spent the winter cooking for them, 
and the judge was kept busy cutting firewood to keep them warm. He 
later opened a legal practice in Topeka in partnership with Democrat 
John Martin, who would be elected to the US Senate in 1893 during the 
Populist era. Justices Sanders Johnston and Joseph A. Williams were 
Buy the Book
Introduction 7
proslavery Democrats, although President Abraham Lincoln later ap-
pointed Williams to a Memphis tribunal that tried civil cases.¹0
The territorial supreme court was early called upon to render an ad-
visory opinion of the type that courts normally do not entertain. The 
first territorial governor, Andrew Reeder, exercised his power proper-
ly, although in his own pecuniary interest, in locating the first capital 
at Pawnee, where he and his associates were engaged in land specula-
tion, and he called the legislature into session there. The legislators re-
fused to meet in the unfinished building provided for them and peti-
tioned President Franklin Pierce to remove Reeder from office. Both 
houses passed an act to gather in Shawnee. The governor vetoed it, the 
assembly passed it over his veto, and they adjourned to gather in Shaw-
nee. This issue arrived at the supreme court in its first session. Justices 
Lecompte and Elmore sustained the legislature’s actions but responded 
to the suit as judges, not as a sitting court. Johnston “declined to partic-
ipate,” as he thought the question was not a proper one to bring before 
the court. President Pierce soon replaced Reeder with Wilson Shannon 
as governor; Shannon also had a short tenure in office.¹¹
John Geary, the competent third territorial governor, complained to 
President James Buchanan that peace in Kansas was impossible with-
out “a complete administrative overhaul of territorial officials, including 
judges,” and he “publicly quarreled” with Chief Judge Lecompte. The 
latter had thwarted the governor’s attempts at making arrests of killers 
by deliberately moving the time and locations of his court. In addition, 
he had freed indicted Kickapoo ranger Charles Hays twice following his 
arrests by Geary. Democrat Geary had sought to be an even- handed ad-
ministrator and help bring peace to Kansas by arresting the killer. Par-
tisan southern Democrat Lecompte granted the accused Hays bail, and 
the sheriff supplied him with “bail- bond.” Geary ordered Hays arrested 
again, but, in Geary’s absence, Lecompte released him on a writ of ha-
beas corpus. The governor concluded that neither Lecompte nor Judge 
Sterling Cato “made any pretense of impartiality.” For Geary, the Hays 
episode proved “the last straw,” and he decided that the people should 
elect territorial judges, a practice many of the states to the east followed.¹²
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The experience of “Governor” Charles Robinson with Cato’s court 
would substantiate Geary’s conclusion that voters should elect judges. 
Under the Topeka “free state” Constitution, Dr. Robinson was elect-
ed governor, and Judge Cato issued a writ for his arrest on the grounds 
that he “had illegally attempted to assume state office.” Robinson was 
acquitted on the basis that he could not “usurp” an office that Cato’s 
court insisted did not exist. These unhappy experiences with an ap-
pointed judiciary were quite vivid in the minds of the delegates to the 
Wyandotte convention.¹³
Following the defeat of the Lecompton Constitution, the state Re-
publican Party was organized at Osawatomie, with Horace Greeley ad-
dressing the delegates. When Greeley arrived in Kansas in late April 
the state was enduring copious rainfall. Travel was precarious and oc-
casionally dangerous because of floodwaters. In typical Kansas weather 
fashion, a month later the state entered a period of extensive drought. 
The decision was made at Osawatomie to draw up a new state consti-
tution. The territory had endured three constitutions —  Topeka in 1855, 
Lecompton in 1857, and Leavenworth in 1858 —  and this constitution 
smashing in three short years was not conducive to stable state build-
ing. Delegates, both Democratic and Republican, were chosen to at-
tend the Wyandotte convention in July 1859. The convention took place 
during the severe drought, which lasted from June 1859 to November 
1860. The temperature often rose to 105° in the shade in late July, and 
crops withered and died. Once again Kansas became an object of east-
ern charity. New York businessman Thaddeas Hyatt, who helped in the 
relief efforts of 1856, joined W. F. N. Arny and Samuel Pomeroy to or-
ganize a relief drive. Pomeroy and James H. Lane of Jayhawk fame were 
elected the first US senators. Pomeroy, one historian observed, was de-
termined to ride to the Senate “on the famine horse.”¹4
Democrats and Republicans faced each other directly for the first 
time in Kansas in electing delegates to attend the Wyandotte meeting. 
The Democrats won Doniphan, Jackson, Jefferson, and Leavenworth 
Counties for sixteen representatives, while Republicans carried the re-
maining counties with thirty- five delegates. Old free state men who 
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wrote the three previous constitutions were “conspicuous for their ab-
sence.” The delegates chose James Winchell, former New York Times 
newspaperman, as president and John A. Martin, current Atchison 
newspaperman, as secretary. The delegates were relatively young and 
neophytes at constitution writing but farsightedly determined to rely 
on proven experience. As with most constitutional conventions, they 
decided to follow tried and true examples from other states as a guide. 
Fourteen of the fifty- two delegates originally came from Ohio, and 
the convention decided to use that state’s document as a frame of refer-
ence. The secretary later recalled that the combination of intense heat 
and the knowledge that territorial scrip, or paper money, “would be re-
ceived by importunate landlords only at a usurious rate” led the dele-
gates to conduct their business “in dispatch,” if not in haste. They real-
ized they needed to stabilize the territory’s inflationary currency, heavy 
debts, and poor credit ratings in order to succeed.¹5
Only fifteen members were over forty years of age, and one- third were 
under thirty. John Martin, publisher of Freedom’s Champion of Atchi-
son, was a key player in this convention and also in the state’s early po-
litical years. Born in 1839, Martin had to decline election to the terri-
torial legislature because he was too young to qualify for the office. He 
was chosen secretary of the Republican Party at Osawatomie, and be-
fore he was eligible to vote he was elected secretary at the Wyandotte 
meeting. When he was twenty- two the governor appointed him a lieu-
tenant colonel in the Eighth Kansas Volunteers. The Eighth joined the 
Army of the Cumberland during the Civil War and participated in the 
campaigns of Chickamauga, Chattanooga, and Sherman’s March to 
the Sea. At age twenty- six Martin was brevetted brigadier general, and 
he returned to Atchison at war’s end to resume publishing his news-
paper, renamed the Daily Champion. His party would twice nominate 
him unanimously for governor.¹6
President Winchell appointed eleven members to the Judiciary Com-
mittee, whose report, when adopted by the convention, became Article 
iii of the Kansas constitution. All but physician J. J. Blunt were law-
yers. Two members were twenty- six years old, three were twenty- eight, 
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one was twenty- nine, one was thirty, one was thirty- five, and two were 
thirty- eight. Four were Democrats from Leavenworth County, and 
one was from Doniphan. All of them refused to sign the final consti-
tution. Agreeing with the decision of their caucus, none of the Dem-
ocrats signed it, objecting that the convention curtailed the boundar-
ies of Kansas too drastically; the legislative body was too large; Native 
Americans were denied the franchise; the requirement for registration 
of voters for approving the constitution was questionable; the refusal 
to exclude free Negroes from the state was immoral; and the appor-
tionment of representatives was unfair. John Martin later expressed the 
view that both parties had committed a blunder they later regretted, 
the Republicans in refusing to include the South Platte country within 
the state’s boundaries and the Democrats in refusing to sign the docu-
ment “they had labored so diligently to perfect.”¹7
Winchell named Samuel A. Kingman of Brown County as chair-
man of the Judiciary Committee. Kingman was a lawyer who later 
compiled a distinctive record in his fifteen years’ service on the state 
supreme court. His committee report on Article iii was mostly based 
on the Ohio Constitution of 1851. This determined the judicial branch 
to be composed of one chief justice and two associates elected by the 
voters for six- year terms with one specifically elected as chief justice. 
The provision for election, not appointment, came from the Ohio doc-
ument, but the territorial experience lent emphasis to its importance, 
although, as will be seen, it did not eliminate politicking while on the 
bench. In addition, there would be five district courts with one judge, 
each elected by the people for four- year terms. The supreme court would 
appoint a secretary and a clerk, and each county would elect a clerk of 
the district court for two- year terms. (Much of this clause came from 
the Topeka Constitution.) Each county would elect a judge for its pro-
bate court, and that judge would also serve as its clerk. The supreme 
court was given original jurisdiction over “proceedings in quo warran-
to, mandamus, and habeas corpus; and such appellate jurisdiction as 
may be provided by law.” The legislature would later establish the ap-
pellate jurisdiction of district courts. The state legislature also would 
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set the salaries of all judges at a minimum of $2,000 annually, and 
this could not be reduced during their tenure. No judge could hold 
any other office “of profit or trust” nor practice law in any state court. 
State judges could be removed from office by resolutions approved by 
two- thirds of the members of both houses, but “the party charged shall 
have had notice and opportunity to be heard.” The Judiciary Commit-
tee reported its work on the seventh day, and two days later its report 
was “perfected” and endorsed. The committee of the whole reduced 
the salaries of judges from the recommended $2,000 to $1,500 and ap-
proved Section iii.¹8
On the seventeenth day the delegates approved Topeka as the capi-
tal city, and the document was signed by all the Republican delegates 
except one, who was ill. The convention directed that election returns 
on the document be made to J. M. Winchell, but Acting Governor 
Hugh Sleight Walsh issued a proclamation directing them to be made 
to him. The effect of this would be to divide the returns by sending 
them to both Winchell and Walsh for their interpretation and action. 
The Democratic Walsh would then proclaim the constitution rejected, 
and Republican Winchell would announce its adoption. This “doubt” 
would provide the Democrat- controlled US Senate “with a pretext” for 
postponing Kansas statehood. The Republican strategy, therefore, was 
to have each county send its election returns to both men. The Dem-
ocrats in the Senate, however, needed no “pretext” to withhold state-
hood for a Republican Kansas that would upset the balance of pow-
er in the Senate.¹9
The constitution was submitted to the voters on 4 October 1859, and 
they approved it with a tally of 10,421 to 5,330 opposed. Every county 
except Johnson and Morris tendered a majority for the constitution. 
Kansans now had to await secession, and Congress admitted them to 
the Union on 29 January 1861, a cold day with temperatures below zero. 
These men wrought well, as their document lasted into the twenty- 
first century with only thirty- seven periodic amendments. This ad-
mission to the Union signified, optimistically, that the period of Kan-
sas “bleeding” was over.²0
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